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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: DWIGHT L. KING } No.F-39 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DWIGHT L. KING, a member of the Bar of this 
Court, has petitioned for a review by this court of the 
proceedings had in the above entitled matter, seeking to 
have annuled and rejected the recommendation of the 
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar entered 
on the 4th day of February, 1957, wherein the Board 
recommended to the Supreme Court, ''that an order be 
entered suspending Mr. Dwight L. King from the prac-
tice of law in this state for a period of six months and 
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until he is recommended for reinstatement by the Board 
of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar upon application 
duly filed and submitted by said court." 
The proceedings were originally initiated upon the 
written complaint of one John ::\L Sherman, an attorney 
licensed to practice in California. ::\1r. Sherman, under 
date of August 6, 1954, wrote to the Utah State Bar 
Commission stating that he wanted to file "a formal 
complaint against a member of the Bar of the State of 
Utah, Dwight L. King, associated with the firm of 
Rawlings, Roberts, Wallace and Black of Salt Lake City.'' 
(R. 3) Mr. Sherman alleged: 
''. . . The basis of the complaint against 
Dwight L. King is clearly indicated by the Court 
records and rna tters contained in the transcript 
of the proceedings which show beyond any reason-
able doubt that Mr. King had personal knowledge 
that certain documents introduced into evidence 
were prepared in his office on the morning of June 
lOth, 1954. Mr. King, through his client, Harold 
J. Schnitzer, produced them, they were admitted 
into evidence on that day with the testimony that 
they had been prepared in Portland, Oregon more 
than a year prior to June of 1~)54. This matter 
was testified to by both Harold J. Schnitzer and 
'Valter E. Hutchinson and at that time ~Ir. King 
himself well knew that the documents were not 
prt>pan'd in Portland, Oregon but were, in fact, 
pr<>pared in his office and by his secretary. 
The record and transcript clearly show that 
l\1 r. J(ing wns in the hotel room in the Hotel Utah 
orcupied hy Harold J. Schnitzer on the morning 
of J uue lOt l1, 1 ~);"")4, lwhn'Pll the hours of 8:30 and 
9 :00 o 'cloek a.m., that he left the hotel room in 
rompany with :\l.r. Hutrhinson and i\lr. Schnitzer 
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to return to his own law office for the purposes of 
preparing the above mentioned documents. 
This conduct on the part of Mr. King is a defi-
nite breach of the Code of Ethics of any bar asso-
ciation and the acts committed by Mr. King in 
permitting perjured testimony to be given to the 
Court and false information given to the Court, 
together with overt and open acts on his part in 
assisting with and participating in these acts are 
clearly such acts that warrant appropriate dis-
ciplinary action by your Commission." (R. 4) 
Following receipt of this communication, the Utah 
State Bar Commission appointed a committee to investi-
gate the matter. This committee held an informal hear-
ing on November 4, 1954, "for the purpose of taking a 
voluntary statement from Dwight L. King, who is here 
in company with Wayne L. Black." (Exh. T 3, p. 1) Mr. 
King, who was not represented by counsel and Mr. 
Wayne L. Black, a fellow member of the Bar, made 
voluntary statements before the committee which state-
ments were stenographically reported and transcribed 
and appear in the record before this Court as Exhibit 
T 3. 
Subsequently, on March 7, 1955, the investigating 
committee through its chairman, Mark K. Boyle, made 
a report to Mr. Lee M. Cummings, Secretary of the Utah 
State Bar, in which the commtitee summarized its activi-
ties as follows : 
''Mr. Sherman alleges generally that Mr. King 
had personal knowledge of the fact that certain 
documents had been prepared and executed in his 
office on June 10, 1954, and that with such knowl-
edge he caused them to be introduced into evidence 
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purporting to be documents which had been pre-
pared many months prior in Portland, Oregon. 
"Mr. King's version is that he was aware that 
some documents were being prepared in his office 
on the morning of June lOth, but that he paid 
little attention to the subject matter thereof and 
that he was taken by surprise when his witnesses 
testified that they had been prepared and executed 
at a different time and place. 
''The Committee feels that this explanation is 
not entirely satisfactory and that .:\Ir. King's con-
duct during the examination of the witnesses indi-
cates that he was not taken by surprise. However, 
according to his own statement he conferred with 
his witnesses during the noon recess and sup-
posedly chastized them for misrepresenting the 
facts, but he nevertheless remained silent during 
the rest of the day when the misrepresentation 
continued. 
"It is the recommendation of the Committee 
that appropriate disciplinary action be taken by 
the Board of Commissioners.'' 
Sometime later, (the record does not disclose the 
date thereof), a formal complaint, Xo. ·F-39 was filed 
and a citation issued to ~r r. King directing him to appear 
within 10 days after the service of the citation upon him 
to defend the allegations of the complaint. (R. 8) The 
complaint alleged that _Mr. l{ing was g-uilty of unpro-
fessional conduct as follows: 
"l{nowingly permitting witnesses to fabricate 
P\'id0nre and testify falsely before the District 
( ~onrt of Davis County., (R. 9) 
The citation was served upon ~Ir. King by mail on 
tlw 3rd day of October, 1~);)3. (R. 11) A motion for a 
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more definite statement was filed requesting the hearing 
committee to require the prosecution more specifically to 
set forth the nature of the charges of unprofessional con-
duct. Particularly, with reference to the phrase, "know-
ingly permitted" the motion asserted that Mr. King 
could not determine whether he was being charged with 
having committed overt acts or with merely acquiescing 
in the acts of others. Likewise, in being charged with 
"permitting witnesses to fabricate evidence" it was also 
urged that the accused could not determine whether the 
evidence claimed to have been fabricated related to docu-
mentary evidence or whether it related to the fabrication 
of oral testimony. (R. 13) 
The motion for more definite statement was over-
ruled without hearing and Mr. King thereupon through 
his counsel filed an Answer denying the allegations of 
the complaint in respect to any unprofessional conduct. 
The matter was finally brought to trial on the 5th 
day of May, 1956, at Provo, Utah, at which time counsel 
for the prosecution posed the question if it were deter-
mined that Mr. King did not actually fabricate evidence 
or permit anyone to testify falsely, "What was Mr. 
King's duty under the Rules of Ethics of the Utah State 
Bar in regard to a matter presented to the court which 
he knew to be false~" (R. 47) 
As its evidence in support of the charges made, the 
prosecution offered ''The full transcript of the record 
in the matter involving Locke vs. the Harsh Utah Cor-
poration, and Mr. Schnitzer." (R. 64) In objecting to 
the introduction of the full transcript of testimony 
counsel for Mr. King stated that he had just overheard 
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opposing counsel state that after the entire record had 
been introduced in evidence they would move to amend 
the complaint to conform to the proof in that it would 
be further claimed and alleged that Mr. King was guilty 
of professional misconduct in failing to advise the court 
that perjury had been committed. (R. 70) 
Thus, for the first time a charge was made that Mr. 
King "had a duty to confer with his clients and then 
divulge to the court the facts, the truth, respecting the 
evidence concerning which false testimony had been 
made.'' ( R. 72) After considerable discussion on this 
matter, counsel for the prosecution were allowed to 
amend their complaint by adding thereto the charge 
''Knowingly refraining from divulging to the court the 
truth concerning such evidence presented to it.'' (R. 85-
88) This amendment to the complaint was objected to 
by counsel for Mr. King who sought to have the Hearing 
Committee proceed with the hearing at that time upon 
the charge made in the original complaint. (R. 89) How-
ever, not only was the amendment accepted but the hear-
ing was continued to a future date. 
The matter came on again for hearing on June 11, 
1956, at which time ~Ir. John ~r. Sherman appeared at 
counsel table with the attorneys for the prosecution. 
\YhPll asked hy Mr. King's counsel as to the nature of 
Mr. Sherman's appearance at the hearing, "Jir. Thomas 
replied: 
"He is here as a witness. He has been sub-
poened as a wi tnP~s, but he has been Yery helpful 
in the a~~oeiation h~· way of adYire in an advisory 
eapacit~· in thi~ matter, but he does not appear 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
here as co-counsel. He merely appears as a wit-
ness." (R. 113) 
The hearing before the committee was concluded on 
the same day, the only persons appearing to testify in 
the matter being Mr. Sherman, Mr. King, and Mr. Wayne 
L. Black. The committee received Exhibits T 1 through 
T 6; and the deposition of Harold J. Schnitzer, a witness 
for the accused Mr. King, was published. 
Following the hearing, the matter was argued by 
counsel for the respective parties on August 6, 1956, and 
thereafter on a date which does not appear from the 
record but which was approximately November 1, 1956, 
the hearing committee submitted its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in which it found in part as 
follows: 
"3. That during the course of said trial, and 
particularly on June 10, 1954, in Davis County, 
Utah, one Harold J. Schnitzer, one of the defend-
ants, represented by said Dwight L. King, and 
Walter E. Hutehison, Secretary of the defendant, 
Harsh Utah, a Corporation, knowingly, while 
under oath, testified falsely before the Court as 
to dates and place upon and at which a resolution 
and waiver of notice of directors of Harsh Utah, 
a Corporation, had been prepared and signed by 
the President and Secretary, respectively, of said 
Corporation. 
"4. That at the time the testimony was given 
by the said Harold J. Schnitzer, and Walter E. 
Hutchison, to wit: on June 10, 1954, as aforesaid, 
the said Dwight L. King, one of counsel for 
Harold J. Schnitzer, and Harsh Utah, a Corpora-
tion, knew that such testimony was false. 
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"5. That the said Dwight L. King did not 
disclose to the Court or to other counsel, true facts 
as to the place and dates of the execution of such 
waiver of notice of directors, and resolution of 
Harsh Utah, a Corporation, until June 21, 1954, 
at a time when said defendants began their case 
in chief in such trial, although such Dwight L. 
King, as counsel, had opportunity to do so. 
"6. That the resolution of Harsh Utah, a Cor-
poration, and the waiver of notice of directors of 
Harsh Utah, a Corporation, were prepared by 
Walter E. Hutchison in the office of Dwight L. 
King, on the morning of June 10, 1954, and signed 
by the said Harold J. Schnitzer, and Walter E. 
Hutchison on that date." 
Based upon the foregoing Findings, the Disciplinary 
Committee determined as a Conclusion of L'iiw that ''The 
said Dwight L. King violated the provisions of Rule III, 
Sec. 32, Sub-Paragraphs 15 and 41 of the revised rules 
of the Utah State Bar governing professional conduct 
and discipline." (R. 281) 
Thereafter, the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar, on February 1, 1957, made its recommendation 
that Mr. l{ing be suspended from the practice of law in 
this state for a period of six (6) months, (apparently 
adopting the Findings and Conrlusions made by the 
Hearing Committee). (R. 282) 
STATEMENT OF POTXTS 
In his Petitioner for ReYiew. Dwight L. l{ing set 
forth his reasons for urging that the recommendation 
and propo~t>d order of the Board of Bar Commissioners 
art> without mPrit and should not be approYed. As broken 
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down and segregated into points, they appear as follows : 
1. The evidence is insufficient to support the implied 
findings that Petitioner did not make a disclosure of the 
facts of the false testimony to the court within a reason-
able time. Under all the facts and circumstances of the 
case, including the pressure being exerted upon Peti-
tioner by the nature of the trial, the tactics and conduct 
of opposing counsel, and the professional desire on the 
part of Petitioner "to maintain inviolate the confidence" 
and ''preserve the secrets of his client,'' Petitioner acted 
with propriety and in keeping with the ethical standards 
of the profession. 
2. Neither the evidence nor the findings justify the 
conclusion that Petitioner violated the provisions of Rule 
III, Sec. 32, Sub-Paragraphs 15 and 41, Revised Rules 
of the Utah State Bar governing professional conduct 
and discipline. 
3. The evidence does not justify the recommenda-
tion of the Board of Bar Commissioners that Petitioner 
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 
six (6) months. 
The foregoing points will be analyzed and discussed 
in this brief under the following headings : 
I. 
PETITIONER DID NOT UNREASONABLY DELAY 
REPORTING THE FALSE TESTIMONY TO THE COURT. 
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II. 
PE~ITIONER'S CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE SUB-
PARAGRAPHS 15 OR 41 OF SECTION 32, RULE III, 
REVISED RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR GOVERN-
ING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE. 
III. 
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THIS CASE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE SUS-
PENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PETITIONER DID NOT UNREASONABLY DELAY 
REPORTING THE FALSE TESTIMONY TO THE COURT. 
Although the amended complaint charged Petitioner 
with knowingly permitting witnesses to fabricate evi-
dence and testify falsely, as well as ''knowingly refrain-
ing from divulging the truth to the court or parties con-
cerning such evidence and testimony,'' the Hearing Com-
mittee failed to find against Petitioner on the first ground 
of the charge. The only finding of any alleged misconduct 
appears in Finding No. 5 to the effect that Dwight L. 
King failed to disclose to the court or to other counsel 
the true facts with respect to the execution of the waiYer 
of notieP and the resolution of the directors until the 21st 
dny of June, 19:)4-, when he had opportunity to do so. 
This finding was not disturbed h~· the Board of Bar Com-
missionPrs and therefore must be deemed to have been 
10 
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approved. Likewise, since the Board of Commissioners 
failed to make any further findings or conclusions, it 
must be taken as accepted that the Board exonerated 
Dwight L. King of any other alleged misconduct. 
Petitioner's position at the hearing was, and now 
is, that if he had a duty to disclose the facts to court and 
counsel he did so within a reasonable time under all the 
facts and circumstances of the case. In order to have a 
full and complete picture of such circumstances, it is 
necessary to give a description of the transactions and 
occurrences surrounding the incident complained of. In 
doing this, we must not only refer to the testimony before 
the Hearing Committee, but also to the testimony in the 
original case, entitled Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Com-
pany, et al. vs. Harsh Utah Corporation and Harold J. 
Schnitzer. This Court is undoubtedly well aware of the 
record in that case since the decision of the trial court 
in Davis County was appealed to this Court. The deci-
sion rendered on appeal is reported in 5 Utah 2nd 244, 
300 P. 2d 610. However, since some of the facts which 
we feel are pertena.nt here may have been obscure or 
lost in the voluminous record before the court we will 
attempt to summarize the facts briefly. 
The particular matter with which we are concerned 
involved the claim of Alvin T. Locke, an intervening 
Plaintiff, against the Harsh Utah Corporation and Har-
old J. Schnitzer. The actual hearing of Locke's case 
began on Tuesday, June the 8th, 1954. (R. 133) Prior 
thereto, ~Ir. Sherman, Locke's attorney, obtained infor-
mation concerning the room in which Mr. Schnitzer would 
be registered at the Hotel Utah. On the Sunday before 
11 
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the 8th, Mr. Sherman obtained a key to the room which 
would be later assigned to Mr. Schnitzer and took a Mr. 
Don H. Terry to the room. Mr. Terry then wired the 
room for the purpose of eavesdropping on all conversa-
tions which might take place therein and for the purpose 
of recording such conversations. A microphone was 
placed over the window of the room, and a wire led from 
the microphone to a suite of connecting rooms down the 
hall and around the corner occupied by :Jfr. Terry and 
Mr. Sherman. (R. 142, 143, 161) During the ensuing days 
of the trial many, if not all, of the conversations taking 
place in Mr. Schnitzer's rooms were monitered and over~ 
heard by Mr. Terry, and tape recordings of some parts 
of these conversations were made. 
The first person called by l\Ir. Sherman to be exam-
ined, was the Defendant, Harold J. Schnitzer, President 
of Harsh Utah Corporation. l\fr. Schnitzer took the stand 
on the afternon of Tuesday, June 8th, and was inter-
rogated by l\fr. Sherman the balance of that day and lal 
day of the 9th. (R. 130, 134) During this examination, 
reference was made to the minute book of the Harsh 
Utah Corporation. l\Ir. Schnitzer testified that this 
minute book was in the possession of the secretary· of 
the corporation, a Mr. \Yalter Hutchinson of Portland, 
Oregon. When l\f r. Sherman continued to press his 
examination concerning the corporate minute book, l\Ir. 
N<'lmitzer advised 1\[r. Sherman that 1\[r. Hutchinson was 
comjng 1 o Salt Lake City and that he would be requested 
to bring tlw minute book with him and that :J[r. Schnitzer 
wonld produce it in court. (R. 1-l-8) 
1~ 
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Mr. Hutchinson arrived in Salt Lake City on the 
evening of June 9, 1954, and came to the hotel room 
occupied by Mr. Schnitzer. There was some conversa-
tion about the minute book which Mr. Hutchinson had 
brought with him. It was decided that it would be ad-
visable to discuss the testimony which Mr. Hutchinson, 
(an expert on federal housing matters) was going to give 
in court while he was in Utah with Dr. Dwight King 
before court the next day. Mr. King was called on the 
phone, invited to meet with the others the following 
morning for breakfast. This conversation and other dis-
cussion between the parties, including some telephone 
conversations, were overheard and recorded by Mr. 
Terry in his room down the hall. At the hearing before 
the Committee, Petitioner produced these tape record-
ings and requested the Committee to hear as much of 
the monitered conversations as it desired. A portion of 
the recording relating to the morning of June 10, 1954, 
was played several times. (R. 193-198) 
The following morning, Mr. King met Mr. Schnitzer 
and Mr. Hutchinson and had breakfast with them at the 
hotel, after which he came to the hotel room. During the 
course of the discussion, reference was made to typing 
certain minutes which belonged in the corporate minute 
book. According to the undisputed testimony of Mr. 
King, he was requested to allow Mr. Hutchinson, who 
was an attorney as well as secretary of Harsh Utah Cor-
poration, use of a stenographer for the purpose of having 
the minutes typed and put into the minute book. Mr. 
King understood that the minutes had been prepared 
but were not in final form and therefore required typing. 
13 
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The conversation in the hotel room between Mr. King 
and Mr. Hutchinson, related to the testimony Mr. Hut-
chinson was to give on the federal housing matters. (R. 
250) The parties finally left to go to Mr. King's office 
where the minutes were to be typed up. The uncontra-
dicted testimony is that upon the arrival at Mr. King's 
office, Mr. King allowed Mr. Hutchinson the use of his 
office and secretary for the purpose of having the minutes 
typed up. Mr. King further testified that Mr. Hutchinson 
had in his possession and appeared to be dictating from 
documents and papers which he, ~Ir. King, assumed were 
the minutes which were being typed and prepared in 
final form. (R. 253, 254) Because of the delay involved 
in the typing of the minutes, it was necessary to call the 
court and request a postponement of the starting time 
that morning. (R. 252) When the people arrived at the 
courthouse, l\Ir. Sherman again put :Jlr. Schnitzer on the 
stand and began to examine him relative to the corporate 
minute book, which at that time was produced and handed 
to ~Ir. Sherman. Keeping ii1 mind, that :Jlr. Terry had 
already monitered the conversation regarding the parties 
going to Mr. King's office where the minutes were to be 
t~·ped up, ~[r. Sherman proceeded to cross-examine ~Ir. 
Schnitzer regarding the minute book and, by leading and 
~uggPHtive questions invited l\Ir. Schnitzer to testify that 
the minutPR had been prepared and signed approximately 
n ~·par before in Portland, Oregon. Finally, Mr. Schnit-
ZPl' broke down and stated that the minutes had actually 
hePn signed h~r him that morning. Thereupon, :Mr. Sher-
man prorePded to go into the matter of the waiver of the 
uotire of the meeting (whirh had also been prepared that 
14 
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morning), and finally obtained a statement from Mr. 
Schnitzer that the waiver of the meeting had actually 
been prepared and signed at the time the meeting was 
held a year before. 
In the present hearing, Sherman testified he could 
observe from the appearance of the two documents that 
they had been prepared on the same typewriter and 
similar in appearance. (R. 178, 179) He also testified 
in response to a question by a member of the Hearing 
Committee: 
''MR. COLTON: Mr. Sherman, which of these 
days did you find out this testimony was perjured~ 
''WITNESS : I first found it out on the lOth 
of June. 
''MR: COLTON: Is that why you were exam-
ining the witness Mr. Schnitzer~ 
"WITNESS: Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchi-
son on the tenth of June, yes.'' 
Following Mr. Sherman's examination, Mr. King 
was given an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Schnitzer, 
but he stated that he had no cross-examination "at that 
time." During the noon hour, Mr. King and Mr. Bleak, 
(who was associate counsel during the trial) had a dis-
cussion with Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. 
Schnitzer was rebuked severely for having testified 
falsely. Mr. Black's testimony of what transpired is 
particularly descriptive: 
''A. My recollection is that the conversation 
commenced before we ra_rived at the place where 
we ate that noon. As a matter of fact the discus-
sion started as soon as we arrived at Mr. King's 
15 
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station wagon and continued while we were travel-
ing to the place where we ate, which was an estab-
lishment known as Wild Horse Charlie's I believe, 
where we customarily ate, and it continued during 
the course of the meal at Wild Horse Charlie's. 
"Q. Is Wild Horse Charlie's down some dis-
tance south of Farmington~ 
"A. Yes, it is on the main highway. 
"Q. Relate what conversation you heard or 
overheard between these parties and what part of 
the conversation you took part in, if any. 
''A. Mr. King, about the first time that we 
were alone and together in his automobile stated 
to Mr. Schnitzer that he was shocked; that he had 
never been the victim of such conduct on the part 
of counsel or of a client, since he had been prac-
ticing law. That his evasion and his refusal to be 
frank and tell the truth on the witness stand was 
shocking to him. And that he had completely lost 
the confidence and the respect of the court, and he 
didn't know-
'' Q. That who had completely lost the confi-
dence of the court~ 
"A. ~Ir. Schnitzer had, and he didn't know 
what was going to come of the situation from that 
point on. 
'' Q. Was anything mentioned with respect to 
l\lr. Hutchinson testifying or the probability of 
his testifying later a bout the same act 1 
''A. Without trying to recollect the exact 
words that were spoken, which I certainly can't 
do at this time, l\Ir. Hutchinson's response to that 
was 'Well, Dwig-ht, I think that you are giving 
this far more importance than it actually has.' He 
~aid, 'I don '1 think this has an~· significance in 
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the case. It can't possibly make any difference.' 
And he said 'I don't think there is going to be 
any further questioning about it and I think you 
are unduly alarmed by this situation.' 
"Q. Did Mr. King make any statement to Mr. 
Hutchinson, as to what his attitude should be 
about these minutes if he were called to testify? 
''A. Mr. King's response to Mr. Hutchison, 
and this part of the conversation took place while 
we were eating after we had arrived at Wild 
Horse Charlie's as I recall, the first part of the 
conversation was confined more to the discussion 
back and forth between Mr. King and Mr. Schnit-
zer. But as we were eating at Wild Horse 
Charlie's, Mr. I{ing said to Mr. Hutchinson that 
he thought that attorneys have frequently had to 
assume responsibility for their own neglect and 
for their own failure to perform their duties to-
wards a client and he thought Mr. Hutchinson 
ought to go back on the witness stand and if he 
was asked any questions about this matter to be 
perfectly frank and perfectly honest about the 
preparation of the minutes and the resolution. 
'' Q. It was a fact, was it not, that Mr. Hut-
chinson was the Secretary of Harsh Utah Cor-
poration and the testimony indicated that it was 
his responsibility to prepare the minutes' 
''A. Yes. Mr. King as I recall, also asked 
'Now what is the fact about this resolution and 
the minutes and the waiver' I want to know what 
the facts are?' Mr. Hutchinson said, 'Well the 
meeting was held. There is no question about 
that.' And he said 'I have a lot of things to do 
and I am busy and I don't know. I was just slow 
in getting them prepared and as a matter of fact 
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'' Q. I think you stated something to the effect 
that Mr. King said 'You should get back on the 
stand.' Had Mr. Hutchinson been on the stand 
at that time~ 
"A. I misstated myself. He had not been on 
the stand but it was anticipated that he would go 
on that afternoon.'' 
Notwithstanding the discussion at lunch, when Mr. 
Hutchinson was called to the witness stand by Mr. Sher-
man, he proceeded to corroborate Mr. Schnitzer's ver-
sion in respect to the time of signing of the minutes and 
the waiver of the notice of the Board meeting. 
After Mr. Sherman's examination of Mr. Hutchin-
son, Mr. King again stated that he had no cross-examina-
tion at that time. Mr. Sherman continued to present his 
case every day of the trial from then until the 21st day 
of June. On Friday, the 18th of June, ~lr. Sherman 
called a Mr. Percy Goddard to testify that the minutes 
of the meeting and the waiver of the notice of the meeting 
had been prepared on the same typewriter at approxi-
mately the same time. ~lr. Sherman also called Mr. 
Terry who testified in some detail concerning conversa-
tions allegedly overheard by him on the wired connec-
tions with ~Ir. Schnitzer's room. 
Not only did ~[r. Terry testify as to what he claimed 
was said, he also purported to identify the various 
persons who made the alleged statements, notwithstand-
ing- it appears from the reeord that the only time that he 
<'\'er ac>1 ually confronted the partirs who had talked was 
when hP :lppt>ared in eourt on the afternoon of June 18th 
to gin• his tPstimmi~'· (R. 163. 164) 
18 
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Although the Hearing Committee found that Mr. 
King did not make a disclosure of facts to the trial court 
or opposing counsel until June 21, 1954, the record does 
show that Mr. King endeavored to on the afternoon of 
June 17, and was prevented from doing so by the tactics 
of Mr. Sherman, who refused to accept any stipulation 
unless Mr. King acknowledged that he and Mr. Black 
participated in the preparation of the records. I quote: 
''I will continue with the examination, unless 
you want to make a complete stipulation the docu-
ments were prepared by Mr. Hutchinson, yourself, 
Mr. Black and Mr. Schnitzer in your office. 
"MR. KING: Mr. Hutchinson, I under-
stand,-
"I offer the stipulation, and you can either 
leave or take, that stipulation is that you, your-
self, and Mr. Schnitzer, Mr. Black and Mr. Hut-
chinson were there. 
"MR. KING: I won't stipulate to that. I had 
nothing to do with preparing the minutes.'' (R. 
153, 154) 
Why Mr. King would have any duty to disclose the 
facts with respect to the preparation of the documents 
to opposing counsel when the latter appeared to have 
all the facts and was attempting to distort them so as to 
implicate Mr. King and Mr. Black in the matter is not 
known. However, the record in the Harsh Utah Corpora-
tion Case, supra, as well as the testimony before the 
Hearing Committee, amply demonstrates the difficult 
circumstances under which Mr. King was attempting to 
try the case. We readily concede that Mr. Sherman is 
not on trial in these proceedings (although there is much 
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evidence to indicate that he should have been censored 
by the trial court on numerous occasions for his conduct) ; 
but his method of operating and proceeding in the trial 
furnishes explanation for the determination by Mr. King 
and Mr. Black to wait until Sherman was through with 
the presentation of his evidence before having Schnitzer 
and Hutchinson make a formal retraction. 
In explaining, on Cross-examination, why a more 
immediate disclosure was not made, Mr. Black testified: 
''A. Well, I suppose there were a complexity 
of reasons why it wasn't corrected on that occa-
sion, Mr. Thomas. I can only relate my own im-
pressions about the matter, which would be this. 
That this was a very shocking and a very unusual 
occurrence, the testimony that had occurred on 
the lOth. It was an occurrence that had called into 
being a number of problems; the first problem 
being to attempt to correct the testimony at that 
time with the possibility that it would be tanta-
mount to the confession of a criminal act on the 
part of our client, whom we represented and 
whose interests we were endeaYoring to protect. 
That problem had to be explored. The next prob-
lem that had to be explored was the welfare of 
our case which was being tried. \V e couldn't com-
pletely a bandon any kind of a plan or any kind 
of an organized thinking in connection with the 
ultimate outcome of the lawsuit in hand. So we 
had the problem of deciding when would be the 
most strategically proper time to correct this tes-
timony. And then we had the problem which was 
a \TPry serious one of convincing a stubborn client 
and a stubborn law~·pr as to what should be done 
and how to do it, and what would be the best 
yn·oepdure on that subject. And between all of 
thos<' problems that combined and came together, 
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plus the fact that this lawsuit was still continuing 
in a rapid fire manner with Mr. Sherman moving 
with his customary mental agility from one sub-
ject to the other and jumping from one subject to 
the other, and trying to keep up with what he was 
doing, I for one can't conceive of any lawyer who 
under those circumstances could reflect calmly and 
considerately and have canons of ethics in mind 
and determine what the proper thing for a lawyer 
to do would be under those circumstances, and 
come to a conclusion on all of those matters in 
the space of one day. That is why we didn't cor-
rect the testimony with Mr. Hutchinson on the 
11th day of June, 1954. 
First of all we have a situation where Mr. Sherman 
had access to all of the confidential conversations taking 
place between Mr. King's client, Mr. Schnitzer and other 
persons coming to the hotel room. This enabled Mr. 
Sherman to anticipate defenses and to produce evidence 
which would not otherwise be available to him, and gen-
erally to confuse and harass opposing counsel in respect 
to any cross-examination or interrogation of witnesses 
called by Mr. Sherman. 
Next we have the attitude of Mr. Sherman in the trial 
itself. There is no doubt but that his belligerence and 
domineering attitude toward l\f r. Schnitzer and Mr. Hut-
chinson (as well as the manner in which he framed the 
questions) was primarily responsible for the perjured 
testimony in the original instance. As testified by Mr. 
Schnitzer in his deposition: 
''A. Mr. Sherman's attitude in questioning 
me, particularly at that particular morning, was, 
it appeared to me, was to unnerve me. He came 
practically up to my face, and shouted in my face, 
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slammed records on the Judge's desk, in, it seemed 
to me, an effort to unnerve me and upset me.'' 
(Deposition p. 14) 
Mr. Schnitzer was corroborated by Mr. Black who 
testified: 
''A. Mr. Sherman that morning and on all 
other occasions when he questioned Mr. Schnitzer 
stood next to him and adopted a manner as though 
shaking a finger in his face and talking in a rather 
loud and bullying fashion, and his mannerisms 
and his demeanor towards l\Ir. Schnitzer was so 
obviously antagonistic and hateful toward him it 
aroused a similar response in Mr. Schnitzer and 
the two of them day after day and throughout the 
proceeding continued in that hostile and antago-
nistic attitude that they evinced toward one an-
other.'' (R. 208) 
It is the opinion of the writer of this brief, and such 
opinion is submitted to this Court for its consideration, 
that ~fr. Sherman was not interested in obtaining from 
~[r. Hutchinson or l\1r. Srhnitzer the truth with respect 
to the preparation of the corporate minutes when he 
examined these individuals on June 10, 1954. The manner 
in which his examination was conducted, as indicated 
above, together with the language in which the questions 
wen' courhed, clearly indicates that ~Ir. Sherman was 
more interested in having a misrepresentation made by 
the wihwss with respect to the preparation of minutes 
than a correct representation. Sinre 'J[r. Sherman could 
not dispute the fad that the mPPting of the directors was 
aetna lly held and that the action was taken as reflected in 
tlw minuteR, the only purpORl~ ·which could be serYed by 
showing that the minutes had not been prepared until 
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the morning of June 10, 1954, was to discredit the testi-
mony of Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson. Obviously, 
this could be accomplished more effectively if the wit-
nesses themselves were induced to misrepresent the facts 
with respect to the execution of the minutes. This would 
also cast more doubt and suspicion upon any other testi-
mony which they might give in the case. We submit that 
Mr. Sherman wanted to win the case on behalf of his 
client by influencing the court not as to the merits of 
his client's position but as to the lack of respect for the 
individuals who were defendants in the case. 
This is further evident by the fact that after the 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court, Mr. Sherman 
used an insidious method of further intimidating the 
Defendant Schnitzer. Not only did Mr. Sherman file the 
original complaint against Mr. King in this matter, but 
also while the appeal in the case of Pacific States Cast 
Iron Pipe Company v. Harsh Utah Corporation, supra, 
was pending before this Court, he wrote a letter to an 
attorney by the name of Walter H. Evans in Portland, 
Oregon, and mailed a copy of the letter to Mr. Schnitzer 
in which reference was made to the appeal, as follows: 
"From all the information I can gather, it 
would appear that the Utah Supreme Court will 
make a decision on the Utah matter within the 
next couple of weeks, and I fully expect a decision 
well in advance of the first day of July. In this 
regard, we have cross-appealed, asking for total 
of $363,895.20 and from all the information I can 
gather we will be successful in a substantial por-
tion of our cross-appeal. In this event, there are 
insufficient funds in the State of Utah to secure 
our judgment in the state of Oregon against other 
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assets of Schnitzer and his various corporations.'' 
(Italics added) 
This letter (Exhibit T 6 in the instant matter) con-
tains repeated innuendos to the effect that the decision 
of the Supreme Court of this State in favor of Locke and 
against Schnitzer is assured, some of which follow: 
"We have also been delaying in the filing of 
our final brief in Montana, in sincere hopes that 
the Utah Supreme Court will make its decision 
prior to the time that briefs must be filed in 
Montana. Because of certain points covered in 
the opinion of the trial court in ~fontana, it would 
be most helpful to have a final judgment in Utah 
in presenting our appeal.'' 
Also: 
"It is entirely possible that prior to the time 
that it is necessary to file pleadings in response 
to the action that Harsh Construction Company 
has started, that we will have obtained a judgment 
from the Supreme Court in Utah in excess of the 
amount on deposit there securing our judgment.'' 
Again: 
''I am very confident that ultimately we will 
obtain a judgment in ~Iontana equal to the amount 
or in excess of the amount that we will obtain in 
Utah, but my better judgment has been to delay 
pushing the action in :\Iontana until we have re-
ceived a final determination from the Supreme 
Court in U tab.'' 
The letter goes on to state that unless "Jir. Schnitzer 
will accede to the demands and claims of :\Ir. Sherman 
and his client Locke, that l\lr. Schnitzer will be unable 
to make :my sale or dif'position of his property: 
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"Both Mr. Locke and I have spent consider-
able time in Washington, D. C. during the past 
year. We found that Schnitzer's reputation for 
underhanded dealings with the various branches 
of the Military is quite famous. I am satisfied that 
Schnitzer himself would not receive favorable con-
sideration in attempting to dispose of his own 
properties beca.use of his past dealings with the 
Government. On the other hamd, Mr. Locke arnd 
myself an.d others connected with our construction 
company have been very fortunate in establishing 
a most congenial relationship with all branches of 
the Government on certain Government contracts 
that our present construction company is engaged 
in, and I am satisfied through connections we have 
established, could dispose of, or assist in dispos-
ing of, Mr. Schnitzer's Wherry Housing Projects 
to his substantial advantage, but of course we 
would not entertain anything of this nature until 
such time as our cla.ims and judgments were satis·-
fied in full. 
"My experience has been that in dealing with 
the United States Government the most advanta-
geous transactions can be consummated by being 
the first to take advantage of any new legislation, 
such as the program to purchase Wherry Housing 
Projects. However, beca.use of the pending liti-
gation a,nd judgments, it is impossible for Schnit-
zer to take advantage of this fa.ct, and he would 
undoubtedly lose again, just as he has in the past, 
by reason of his not being 'willing to make final 
settlement with Jllr. Locke." (Italics added) 
On cross-examination in the instant matter, Mr. 
Sherman admitted sending a copy of the above letter to 
~Ir. Schnitzer but denied that his purpose in sending it 
was to use a psychological force in effecting a settlement 
of Locke's claim in the case of Pa('ific Rtates Cast Iron 
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Pipe Company v. Harsh Utah Corporation. (R. 160) 
Although it is most difficult to reconstruct the actual 
conditions which existed during the trial of the case, the 
facts outlined above should be of assistance to this Court 
in understanding the tension and extreme pressure under 
which Mr. King was laboring. With this in mind, let us 
proceed to discuss the events which transpored between 
June lOth, {the date on which the false testimony was 
given), and June 21st, (the date on which a complete and 
full disclosure thereof was made by Mr .. Schnitzer and 
Mr. Hutchinson). Mr. Sherman was in the process of 
presenting the case for his client Mr. Locke from June 
8th, (which was a Tuesday), until June 21st. The lOth 
of June was on a Thursday and the false testimony given 
by Mr. Schnitzer occurred in the morning of that day, 
while the false testimony of Mr. Hutchinson occurred in 
the afternoon. Immediately following the testimony of 
Mr. Hutchinson in the afternoon of June lOth, Mr. Sher-
man proceeded to call other witnesses and to examine 
them on the afternon of June lOth and the morning of 
June 11th. In the afternoon of Friday, June 11th, :Mr. 
King endeavored to get the court's permission to put Mr. 
Hutchinson back on the stand to testify with respect to 
the special matter for which he had been called from 
Portland, Oregon. This matter related to the lump sum 
contract and unless he was allowed to testify then, he 
woulrl have to remain over until the next week. 
At first Mr. Sherman objerted, and the court allowed 
Mr. ~herman to proceed with other witnesses until ap-
proximately one-half an hour before the time of adjourn-
ment. .At that time l\f r. King again interrupted and the 
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court allowed Mr. King to put Mr. Hutchinson on the 
stand to testify with respect to the lump sum contract. 
Some claim has been made that Mr. King should at that 
time have attempted to correct the record in respect to 
Mr. Hutchinson's testimony. However, it must be borne 
in mind that the time was very limited in which Mr. King 
could examine Mr. Hutchinson with respect to the matter 
involving the merits of the case and at that time, Mr. 
King and Mr. Black were still endeavoring to ascertain 
what the best means would be of correcting the record. 
Following Mr. Hutchinson's testimony on the after-
noon of Friday, June the 11th, the court adjourned until 
Monday morning June the 14th. Mr. Sherman continued 
to present Locke's case Monday the 14th, Tuesday the 
15th, Wednesday the 16th, Thursday the 17th, and Friday 
the 18th. Again the court adjourned on Friday after-
noon, the 18th, until Monday morning June the 21st and 
it was on this day that Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchin-
son got on the stand as the first witnesses called by Mr. 
King in presenting the defense. 
Certainly when the false testimony was given on the 
lOth of June by Th1:r. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson, both 
~Ir. Black and Mr. King were deeply shocked and con-
siderably worried as to how the record should be cor-
rected to the best interest of their clients. The question 
whether the individuals could be relieved of the perjury 
if they got on the stand and recanted was before counsel. 
Mr. Black's testimony as to the position counsel were in 
and as to the course which they followed in ascertaining 
and determining what should be done is as follows: 
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"Q. Did Mr. King consult with you with 
reference to what should be the position that he 
should take, and that of his client, Mr. Schnitzer, 
with reference to what they had stated on the 
lOth~ 
''A. Yes. The first opportunity I believe that 
we had to actually sit down and discuss the subject 
was on Saturday. Because Friday of course Mr. 
King was extremely busy and at the end of the 
day of trial work we separated immediately upon 
arriving back in Salt Lake and we didn't have an 
opportunity to actually discuss the matter except 
in our proceedings in Farmington and Salt Lake. 
But on Saturday we were both in the office to-
gether and we were both working toward discov-
ering what the law was with respect to recantation 
of perjury and the effect recantation would have 
legally upon the party involved, so that we could 
apprise ourselves of just what our legal problem 
was. 
"Q. When you speak of perjury, are you re-
fering to the testimony Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. 
Hutchinson had given on the lOth 1 
"A. I was. And my advice to :Jlr. King, and 
he heartily agreed with me, was this. I stated to 
Mr. King that there was only one course that we 
could possibly follow in this case, that there was 
only one way that we could ever rehabilitate Mr. 
Schnitzer in the eyes of the court and re-establish 
his credibility in this case and that was for him 
to get back on this witness stand and tell the abso-
lute truth about this matter and to correct the 
record. And furthermore, I adYised Mr. King and 
he heartily agreed with me, we had a complete 
meeting of the minds on it, that we should by all 
means bend eYer~' effort to get .1\Ir. Hutchinson to 
come back to Salt Lake at the proper time and 
that the best time as far as our case was con-
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cerned, and correct his testimony as well. We 
discussed the very serious situation that con-
fronted Mr. Hutchinson, being a member of the 
bar of his state, and attorney at law, and the effect 
this might have on him. But our feeling on it as 
we discussed it, was that he had gotten himself 
into this thing over the advice that Mr. King had 
given him and against the wishes of counsel 
handling the case and that it was just one of those 
unfortunate situations where he had gotten him-
self into this situation and he would have to get 
himself out. 
"Q. You said he had gotten into it "over" 
the advice. You mean-' 
"A. Against the advice of Mr. King. 
'' Q. Did you and Mr. King do some research 
as to recantation' 
''~I\.. Yes, we did. 
'' Q. Do you recall reading a case as to the 
testimony of Senator Norris' 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. What was the effect of that case, so far 
as your determination as to whether any recan-
tation on the part of either Schnitzer or Hutchin-
son would avoid perjury' 
''A. We satisfied ourselves, and of course the 
Norris case is clear that recantation, no matter 
how soon it was given after perjury on the witness 
stand, will not cleanse the record of perjury, but 
on the contrary it will be nothing more or less 
than a confession of guilt. 
'' Q. Then in respect to your conclusion, you 
say you and Mr. King concurred in and were 
unanimous in, what was the purpose of having 
Mr. Schnitzer and 1\lr. Hutchinson get beak on the 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stand or resolving that they should get back on 
the stand and clear the record? 
"A. Well, the thing that was foremost in our 
minds and of greatest importance to us was the 
conviction that we had, as a result of observing 
the situation, that the court had lost confidence in 
our client and that the court unquestionably had 
come to the conclusion that he was unworthy of 
belief, and our primary concern was to re-estab-
lish the integrity of our client in the eyes of the 
court and to correct the record for that reason." 
(R. 208-210) 
Mr. King, on cross-examination, explained the prob-
lem similarly: 
'' Q. Now when this thing started to unfold in 
court, the falsity of the testimony of Mr. Schnit-
zer, as I suppose it started to unfold on the lOth 
of J nne, and then subsequent to that time you and 
Mr. Black decided upon a course of action and as 
you have stated, I believe, you were somewhat 
confused and didn't know what direction to turn 
or what to do. I think that was in substance Mr. 
Black's testimony. 
''A. No, I don't think we didn't know which 
way to turn. We were very much aware that these 
men were in an extremely dangerous position. 
That they were men of substance and character in 
the eommunity and there was a Yer}T difficult prob-
lem. First we had this job of informing the court 
concerning the truth of the matter and as a second-
ary consideration we had the welfare of Mr. Hut-
ehinson. You might not know it but he is about 
Rixty years old, a Yery dignified appearing person, 
and an intelligent man and I considered very care-
fully the course we were to take. 
'' Q. Some time before the actual testimony of 
~PetT~' and of Goddard, I believe you and Mr. 
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Black concluded that the record should be cor-
rected. Can you fix about when that took place1 
Was it over the week end when you had the oppor-
tunity to talk to Mr. Black that that occurred 1 
''A. We concluded that the record should be 
corrected during the lunch hour, before we even 
got out of Wild Horse Charlie's and that is what 
I told Mr. Hutchinson to do. I told him to correct 
that record and I told Mr. Schnitzer to do it too. 
"Q. That was the lOth, wasn't it1 
"A. That was the day it occurred and there 
wasn't any ifs, ands, or buts about that, and there 
wasn't any equivocation on the instructions. But 
they didn't correct the record that afternoon and 
that night we began to thrash around and try to 
resolve the problems we were confronted with." 
(R. 270, 271) 
Mr. Schnitzer, in his deposition, testified that not 
only had they agreed to correct the record at the first 
available opportunity, but that a transcript on the testi-
mony had been ordered prior to the 17th of June, in 
order that the specific statements could be referred to 
and corrected as made : 
''MR. THOMAS: Q. Well, Mr. Schnitzer,-
This is on the record- when you finally did 
decide that it would be proper for you to take the 
stand again and testify in respect to the truth 
and to put Walter Hutchinson back on the stand 
to testify to the truth at that time Mr. Hutchinson 
was not in Salt Lake City, and you called him back 
from wherever he was to so testify. That's cor-
rect, is it not? 
"A. That is exactly right. Walter left imme-
diately after he testified on the stand on June lOth, 
and we wouldn't have had an earlier opportunity 
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until Mr. King took over the case, and it was at 
that precise time that I was put on the stand and 
Mr. Walter Hutchinson was put on the stand to 
clear this record. 
"Q. Now, what I am trying to get at, Mr. 
Schnitzer, is when Mr. King decided to put you 
back on the stand prior to the testimony of Mr. 
Terry. 
''A. I can't give you the exact date, but I can 
say this: that we had discussed it, and we had 
ordered-Mr. King had ordered a transcript of 
that particular portion of the testimony from my-
self and Mr. Hutchinson of June lOth well before 
Terry ever was brought to the stand, so that 
prove conclusively that we were thinking and 
planning the correction of these particular state-
ments. 
'' Q. Did he order a transcript prior to the 
testimony of Percy Goddard, do you know 1 
''A. I don't recall exactly in the space of time 
that Goddard came in, but I believe-it is my 
recollection-! might be wrong-that the tran-
script was ordered the afternoon or the next 
Monday after the testimony of June lOth." (De-
position, page 43, 44) 
Implicit in the finding by the Hearing Committee 
that the accused Mr. King, did not disclose all of the 
facts to the court and opposing counsel until June 21, 
1954 is the conclusion that it was ~Ir. King's duty to 
disclose such facts some time prior to that date. When 
he should have disclosed the facts is not determined. 
Should he han? disclosed them immediately at the time 
of 1 he false testimony f Certainly from the record it 
would appPar that no one "Tas deceived by the testimony 
si II<'<' l\1r. Sherman testified that he knew both Schnitzer 
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and Hutchinson were lying; and Mr. Black testified that 
although he at that time knew nothing about the typing 
of the minutes, it was very obvious that Schnitzer was 
"guilty of falsehood by evasion at least." (R. 211) 
Exhaustive research on the subject has resulted in 
finding one case quite similar in point where the question 
of the duty to disclose and the responsibility of an attor-
ney for failing to disclose was involved. In the case of 
In Re Hoover, (Ariz. 1935) 46 P. 2d 647, the attorney 
was charged, among other things, with the following mis-
conduct: 
"1. For purchasing on November 16, 1933, a 
bottle of cough syrup during the progress of ~ 
case, State of Arizona v. Rola Marlow, No. 1890, 
then pending in the Superior Court of Yuma 
County, State of Arizona, in which case you rep-
resented the defendant, giving the bottle of cough 
syrup so purchased to the defendant, Marlow, and 
permitting him to testify under oath that he, the 
defendant, Marlow, had purchased the said bottle 
of cough syrup just prior to the time when he was 
arrested.'' 
Hoover, the accused attorney, had represented Mar-
low on a drunk driving charge. During the course of the 
trial, Hoover put Marlow on the stand to testify with 
respect to the matter. On cross-examination by the 
attorney for the state, Marlow testified that the odor of 
alcohol which had been discerned by the police officer at 
the time of his arrest was the odor of cough syrup. At 
that time, Marlow took a bottle of cough syrup from his 
pocket, which had been partly consumed, and testified 
that this was the bottle from which he had been drinking. 
Upon heing questioned as to where he had obtained the 
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bottle he testified that he had purchased it at Minor's 
Drug Store prior to the time of the arrest. In fact, how-
ever, the actual bottle of cough syrup which he produced 
had been purchased by the attorney, Hoover, during the 
course of the trial. Hoover had given it to Marlow, ac-
cording to Hoover's statement, with the understanding 
that Marlow would identify it as being a bottle similar 
to that from which he had been drinking at the time of 
his arrest. The Board of Governors of the Arizona Bar 
found Marlow guilty of misconduct and recommended 
that he be reprimanded in respect thereto. In holding 
the evidence was insufficient to justify any reprimand, the 
Supreme Court of Arizona stated: 
''Plainly it was respondent's duty, when his 
client incorrectly and falsely stated that he bought 
the medicine himself, to endeavor by questions put 
to him to elicit the correct and truthful answer. 
This duly he owed to his client, to the court, and 
to himself. While a lawyer owes the duty to his 
client of seeing that his rights are fully protected 
under the forms of the law, he is never justified 
in imposing upon the court or knowingly permit-
ting his client to do so by testifying falsely. We 
think that an experienced right-thinking lawyer, 
under the circumstances, would have felt impelled 
to take steps, before his client left the witness 
stand or during the trial, to haYe him correct his 
testimony. Beca.usP respondent did not do so, how-
ever, we cannot concludr that his silrrrce was 
necessarily a studied effort to impose upon the 
conrt, or a wilful disregard of the ethical stand-
a-rds of the profession .. It wa,.~ in the midst of the 
tria1 and respondent dou.btlrss 1ca.s taken un-
au.'arf's and did not eJ:pecf or think that his client 
wo"!d makr such a statf'ment. Under such circum-
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stances, the wisest most experienced lawyer might 
hesitate to elicit the real truth for fear of jeopar-
dizing his client's ca.se. There was nothing un-
ethical in respondent's buying the medicine for 
illustrative purposes in the trial, if done openly 
and above board. The truth about the purchase of 
the bottle would have answered as well or better 
than a lie. There was no reason for the respondent 
to have incited Marlow to swear falsely, and we 
do not think that he did. The most that can be 
said is that he remained silent when he should 
have spoken. We do not think that respondent's 
conduct in the Marlow case merits his disbarrment, 
suspension or reproval. We are satisfied if like 
circumstances ever arise in his practice he will 
act more ethically and more wisely.'' (Italics 
added.) 
The conduct of the attorney in the Hoover Case is 
far more questionable than the conduct of Mr. King in 
the instant matter. In the Hoover Case, the attorney not 
only set the stage for what took place (by buying the 
cough syrup and delivering it to the defendant), but he 
also allowed his client to take advantage of the false and 
perjured testimony by not correcting it before the case 
was completed. In the instant matter, the attorneys had 
nothing to do with the production of the testimony nor 
with the testimony itself. And subsequently the matter 
was corrected before the case was ever submitted to the 
court so that there could have been no prejudice result. 
As will hereinafter be urged, there seems to be no reason 
why the attorney who has not caused the false statement 
to be made should not be permitted to make a disclosure 
to the court at any time hefore the client appears to have 
obtained an unfair advantage by reason of the perjured 
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or false testimony. 
Our court has on more than one occasion announced 
the rule with respect to the degree of proof necessary to 
establish misconduct on the part of an attorney. In the 
case of In Re Hanson, 48 Utah 163, 158 Pac. 778, the 
court stated the rule as follows: 
''To disbar an attorney is a very serious 
matter indeed. It not only may deprive him of 
gaining a livelihood for himself and a dependent 
family, but it may, and usually does, result in 
preventing him from making available all ante-
cedent preparation, although that may cover prac-
tically the period of a lifetime. In no other calling 
are such far-reaching consequences visited upon 
a delinquent who has not been found guilty of 
some felonious act. The rule, therefore, that the 
evidence should be clear a;nd convincing is based 
upon a most solid foundation. (Italics added.) 
Again in In Re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 Pac. 
2d 13, the court stated : 
''The standard or quantum of proof which 
should govern this court in such a review was 
stated in Re Hanson, supra, at page 167 of 48 
Utah, at page 779 of 158 P. to be: '• • • "the 
charges should be clearly sustained by convincing 
proof and a fair prepondenance of the evidence.'' 
* * * the evidence should be clear and convincing 
"" * * ' 
''And in Re Evans & Rogers, 22 Utah 366, 387, 
62 P. 913, 919, 53 L.R.A. 952, 83 Am. St. Rep. 794; 
'The summary proceeding of disbarment is civil, 
and not criminal. 6 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 709; Matter 
of Randel, 158 N. Y. (216) 219, 51 N. E. 1106; 
State v. Clarke, 46 Iowa 155. In that proceeding, 
howPVPr, more th::.n a preponderanre of the evi-
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dence is required. The guilt of the attorney must 
be clearly established.' '' 
A general annotation on the subject may be found 
in 105 A.L.R. 984, 987. 
In the case of In Re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 52 N.E. 
2d 807, the court held that a lawyer will not be subjected 
to discipline merely upon suspicious circumstances, cit-
ing an earlier case where the court had held: 
"In order for a recommendaiton of disbarment 
to stand there must be not only a charge of moral 
turpitude but also proof of the charge made. The 
proof, we have consistently announced, must be 
of a convincing character. Suspicious circum-
stances do not suffice. The proof must be clear 
and convincing." In Re Amaden, 380 Ill. 545, 44 
N.E. 2d 558. 
The foregoing authorities, when considered in the 
light of the testimony in the instant matter, not only 
establish that Mr. King did not act unreasonably under 
all the circumstances of this case, but support the other 
propositions urged in this Brief, to the effect that the 
rharges against him should be dismissed. 
II. 
PETITIONER'S CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE SUB-
pARAGRAPHS 15 OR 41 OF SECTION 32, RULE III, 
REVISED RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR GOVERN-
ING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE. 
While the amended complaint filed in this case 
against ~Ir. King, and the finding of the Hearing Com-
mittee, accuses ~Ir. King of failing to report to the court 
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the true facts with respect to certain false testimony, 
the Hearing Committee actually determined that such 
alleged conduct was unethical because it is claimed that 
such action and conduct on the part of Mr. King violated 
the provisions of Sub-Paragraphs 15 and 41 of Section 
32, Article III, Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar 
governing professional conduct and discipline. We re-
spectfully submit that even though it may be concluded 
that Mr. King did not report the facts to the court or 
opposing counsel concerning the false testimony until 
June 21, 1954, that such cation on the part of Mr. King 
did not in any way violate either fo the foregoing pro-
visions. Sub-Paragraph 15 of Section 32, Rule III pro-
vides as follows : 
''Nothing operates more certainly to create or 
to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a 
class, and to deprive the profession of that full 
measure of public esteem and confidence wh~h 
belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than 
does the false claim that it is the duty of the 
lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed 
in winning his client's cause as is often set up by 
the unscrupulous in defense of questionable trans-
actions. 
"It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argu-
ment his personal belief in his rlient 's innocence 
or in the justire of his cause. 
''The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the in-
terest of the rlient, warm zeal in the maintenance 
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his 
utmost learning and ability,' to the end that 
nothing lw taken or be withheld from him, save 
h~T the ru}N; of law, legally applied. No fear of 
jurlirinl disfa,·or or public unpopularity should 
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restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. 
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the 
benefits of any an.d every remedy and defense that 
is a;uthorized by the law of the land, and he may 
expect his la.wyer to assert every such remedy or 
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind 
that the great trust of the lawyer is to be per-
formed within and not without the bounds of the 
law. The office of attorney does not permit, much 
less does it demand of him for amy client, violation 
of law or any manner of fra;ud or chican.e. He must 
obey his own conscience and not that of his 
client." (Italics added.) 
Sub-Paragraph 41 of Section 32, Rule III, provides 
as follows: 
"When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or 
deception has been practiced, which has unjustly 
imposed upon the court or a party, he should en-
deavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, 
and if his client refuses to forego the advantage 
thus ~tnjustly gained, he should promptly inform 
the injured person or his counsel, so that they 
may take appropriate steps." (Italics added.) 
If the testimony of either Mr. King or Mr. Black 
is to be given any weight (and we respectfully submit 
that there is no evidence in the record to the contrary), 
the portion of sub-paragraph 15 which appears in italics 
was being closely followed by them in the matter before 
the court. This is much more than can be said of oppos-
ing counsel who, although well aware of the false state-
ments made on the witness stand by Mr. Schnitzer and 
:\f r. Hutchinson, failed to disclose the information to the 
court until the 18th of June so that in the meantime he 
eould continue to monitor and overhear the conversations 
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going on in Mr. Schnitzer's room. If Mr. Sherman had 
been forthright with the court or with the witnesses who 
were on the stand on June lOth, 1954, he would· have 
immediately disclosed that he knew the minutes were not 
prepared nor the waiver of notice of the meeting signed 
until that morning. However, to have done so would have 
destroyed the possibility of his continuing to use the wire 
tapping system, and would have exposed him as an un-
scrupulous individual in the methods used in obtaining 
information by such device. Mr. Sherman did not make 
any disclosure to the court until at the final conclusion 
of the evidence in his case and during the interim made 
no reference in the record at all to the fact that the testi-
mony given on the lOth was false. (R. 188) On the other 
hand Mr. King and Mr. Black made preparations to bring 
the matter to the attention of the court in such a way as 
to minimize the derrogatory affect it would have upon 
their client's cause, realizing at the same time, that in 
doing so they were acknowledging the commission of a 
crime by Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson which could 
not be expunged from the rec.ord by recanting. See 
United States l'. Norri.s, 300 U.S. 564, 81 L. Ed. 808, 57 
Sup. Ct. 535 where the court stated: 
''The respondent admitted he gave intention-
ally false testimony on September 22d. His re-
cantation on the following day cannot alter this 
fad." 
We submit that the provisions of Sub-paragraph 15 
apply far more to the eonduct of 1\ir. Sherman than to 
nn~· alleged misconduct on the part of 1\Ir. King. 
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Implicit in the italicized portion of sub-paragraph 
41 is the proposition that the client has, by reason of 
fraud or deception, obtained an advantage from the 
court. It is this advantage unjustly gained by the client 
which the attorney must forego and obtain permission 
of his client to forego or withdraw from the case. In the 
instant matter the evidence is undisputed that no unfair 
advantage or any advantage at all was gained by the 
false testimony. Everyone appears to be in agreement 
that the court was very dissatisfied with the evasive way 
Mr. Schnitzer attempted to answer Mr. Sherman's ques-
tions on the morning of the lOth, so that the advantage, 
if any, was with the opposing party rather than with Mr. 
Schnitzer. Too, the decision of the trial court in that 
case indicates that it was influenced by the nature of the 
false testimony and the conduct of Mr. Schnitzer on the 
witness stand since the judgment which it rendered was 
later reversed by this Court. In reversing the judgment 
this court stated: 
"We have a great deal of sympathy for the 
trial court which was required to wade through 
a morass of claimed embezzlement and perjury, 
accusations and counter-accusations as well as 
recriminations between opposing counsel, but we 
cannot allow even the self-confessed perjury of 
the appellant Schnitzer to blind our eye to the 
plain, unambiguous terms of the contract between 
the parties." (5 Utah 2nd 244, 257, 300 P. 2d 610) 
It is also significant that the confessed false testi-
mony related to an immaterial matter, the actual prepa-
ration and signing of the minutes in question being im-
material to the issues in the case. See State v. Hutchin-
sn 11, 4 Utah 2d 404, 406, 295 P. 2d 345. 
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In the case of In Re Watson, 83 Neb. 211, 119 N.W. 
451, the accused attorney had dictated an affidavit in the 
presence and hearing of the witness, but had the witness 
sign a blank paper below where the information was to 
be typed. After conferring with another attorney it was 
decided that additional statements were needed in the 
affidavit and after the witness had gone the additional 
statements were added to those which the affiant had 
previously disclosed. The affidavit further stated that 
the statements were made before three witnesses, all of 
which was not true. After the corrected affidavit was 
typed up, the attorney instructed a notary in the office 
to notarize and find the affiant and have him sign it at 
the bottom again. However, the notary could not find 
the affiant so the name apparently was erased in the 
position where it had originally been signed and placed 
at the end of the instrument. It was a forgery. Subse-
quently, the attorney who prepared the affidavit was 
accused of an effort to deceive and practice a fraud upon 
the court and of causing a false, forged and untruthful 
affidavit to be made. Upon review of the facts the Su-
preme Court of ~ ehraska held that in the absence of 
any attempt on the part of the attorney to take adYantage 
of the affidavit the conduct would not warrant discip-
linary action h~· disharrment or suspension. The court 
rommented: 
''Had he made an attempt to mislead or de-
ceive the court c>Yen though unsuccessfully, it 
would havc> been a different question.'' 
In the instant matter, ~r r. King did nothing to mis-
IPnd the court. He did not have anything to do with the 
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preparation of the minutes or of the waiver of notice 
of meeting and the Hearing Committee has not found 
that he had any connection therewith. Nor did he elicit 
the false testimony before the court or at any time 
attempt to take advantage of such false testimony or 
attempt to influence the court therewith. In the case of 
In Re Palmeri, 162 N.Y.S. 799, 176 App. Div. 58 (Order 
reversed 117 N.E. 1078), the attorney, charged with un-
professional conduct, had previously defended one De-
Lane in a criminal case. DeLane was charged with 
living from money given him out of the profits of certain 
prostitutes. The District Attorney had a complaining 
witness, a prostitute, whom he allowed to live in a certain 
flat, rather than in custody, during the time awaiting 
trial. One day she disappeared and the police were un-
successful in finding her. The State's case was greatly 
weakened because of her absence. During the middle of 
the Defendant's case, she appeared in the courtroom with 
a suitcase in hand, and testified, upon being called as a 
defense witness, that she read about the case in a news-
paper out of town and just arrived in town. As a matter 
of fact she had not left town and had been in constant 
touch with the Defendant's attorney who had staged her 
spectacular appearance. She testified falsely as to other 
matters also, which the attorney for Defendant knew 
were false. He relied upon these false statements in sum-
ming up to the jury, and made no effort to correct them. 
The. lower court, in finding the attorney guilty of 
unprofessional conduct stated: 
"We cannot think that an attorney conforms 
to professional standards where he permits a 
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witness procured by him, and regarded by him as 
highly important, to state a play by suddenly 
appearing in the courtroom with a suitcase in her 
hand, and by permitting her to testify that she 
had just arrived on an early morning train, that 
no one knew of her coming, and that her attention 
had been called to the trial by an evening paper 
in an up-state town the night before, when he 
knew that she had been sent for by his client, had 
been at his home in consultation with him in a 
distant part of the city each day of the trial, and, 
to his knowledge, was deliberately and knowingly 
testifying falsely. His failure to say to her on 
her first statement that she had just reached town 
that morning: 'Why, are you not mistaken? Did 
you not come to see me yesterday f' is susceptible 
to the interference that he knew exactly what she 
was going to testify to ; and his second question 
as to what she had in her hand when she entered 
the courtroom was to draw attention to the suit-
case and add veisimilitude to her narrative. If 
there be any grounds for not holding respondent 
to a strict accountability for her false testimony, 
there certainly is no excuse for his adopting such 
false testimony, in his own summing up, for 
which he was alone responsible . . . He is there-
fore debarred." 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (117 N.E. 1078) 
the decision of the lower court was reversed by a memor-
andum which held that the ''evidence does not warranty 
the conclusion that there was intentional misconduct on 
the part of the appellant, justifying his disbarrment upon 
thP charge sustained by the Appellate decision." This 
dPeision in effect approved the dissenting opinion ren-
dPl'Pd in tlw lowPr court wherein Justice Page stated 
that the evidence wa~ insufficient that the attorney 
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"coached or instructed the witness to testify as she did"; 
and since the witness gave the false testimony volun-
tarily and not in response to any questions of the attor-
ney, the attorney was not responsible and not guilty of 
misconduct. 
Another case which we feel is significant and pur-
suasive in this matter is the case of In Re Smith, 365 Ill. 
11, 5 N.E. 2d 227. There the complaint charged that 
Smith, an attorney, while representing a colored de-
fendant, caused the defendant to change clothes with his 
brother and the brother to blacken his face with burned 
cork. It was discovered by the State's attorney and the 
Court instructed the men to change clothes and for de-
fendant to appear as he did when brought to the court-
house on the morning of the trial. The attorney said 
he only wanted the defendant to appear just as he was 
on the night of the alleged crime, and thus had the two 
people change clothes and add black to their faces. The 
trial court indicated it did not believe that the attorney 
was attempting to impose on the court. However, the 
state's attorney thought it was an attempt to confuse 
his witnesses on their identification. The Supreme Court 
of Illinois held: 
''Each case of this character must be con-
sidered on its own merits, as no hard and fast rule 
can be laid down to govern them all. To justify 
disbarrment, proof of carelessness or mistaken 
judgment is not sufficient. Misconduct complained 
of must be shown by clear and convincing testi-
mony to have been fraudulent and the result of 
dishonest and improper motives. The proof must 
not only show acts of misconduct, but must clearly 
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show they were intended to defraud or deceive. 
The burden of proof where fraud is charged is 
upon the party bringing the charge, as all men 
are presumed to act from honest motives wntil 
the contrary is shown. Charges of misconduct, to 
form the basis for disbarrment or suspension of 
an attorney, must be proved by clear and convinc-
ing testimony. The record must disclose a case 
that is free from doubt, not alone as to the act 
done, but also as to the fraudulent motive with 
which it is done ... The mere failure of an attor-
ney to exercise good judgment in a transaction 
with his client, due to his inexperience, where no 
motive or intent to cheat or defraud is shown, 
does not disclose any fraudulent intent or dis-
honest motive on the part of respondent, we do 
not believe it justifies his disbarrment or suspen-
sion from the practice of law." (Italics added.) 
The italicized portion above clearly demonstrates 
that the motive of the attorney must be established as 
being dishonest and improper, not only by suspicion or 
by a preponderance of the evidence, but by clear and 
convincing evidence. We submit in this case that the 
evidence does not so establish and that the ac-eused Mr. 
King did not have any dishonest or improper motives 
in remaining silent when the witnesses testified falsely 
upon examination by opposing counsel. 
III. 
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THIS CASE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE SUS-
PENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. 
As hereinbefore stated, both the facts as well as the 
authorities cited in thi~ brief support the proposition 
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that the accused Mr. King acted reasonably under all 
the facts and circumstances; and the evidence fails to 
disclose by clear and convincing proof that he is guilty 
of any misconduct. The most that can be said is that by 
reason of the innuendos and statements of Mr. Sherman 
and Mr. Terry there are suspicious circumstances but 
when these circumstances are considered in the light of 
all of the testimony in the case any doubt as to the integ-
rity and professional responsibility of Mr. King should 
be dispelled. 
This is not a csae, for instance, where the attorney 
has been charged and convicted of withholding client's 
money as was the case in In Re Barclay, 82 Utah 208, 24 
P. 2d 302 where the court suspended the attorney for 
three months for the misappropriation of his client's 
funds. Rather, we refer the court to the case of In Re 
Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac. 217 where the court, thir-
teen years after the original accusation was filed against 
the attorneys, exonerated them from any misconduct on 
the basis of all of the facts and circumstances attendant 
in the matter. 
When this entire case is boiled down to the ''nub'' 
and all of the chaff and straw blown away, we have only 
the claim and the finding that Mr. King did not promptly 
and immediately notify the court with respect to his 
knowledge concerning false statements made by his client 
on examination by opposing counsel. We agree with the 
statement made by 2\f r. Black on cross examination: 
' ' A. I have been trying cases in the courts of 
this state for a good number of years. I have been 
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confronted on a good number of occasions, both 
as counsel for and as counsel against parties who 
in my judgment and in my opinion have testified 
falsely. I have on every occasion when my own 
client has done that, endeavored to the very best 
of my ability to correct the record and to bring 
out the truth in that case. But I have yet to see 
one single counsel who in all my experience stood 
forth immediately and without question, either 
before the court or in the chamber of the court 
and denounced the perjury in part, and I will say 
this, if that is the proper thnig to do and the 
appropriate thing for counsel to do, then we ought 
to be educated to that fact and we ought to have 
a clear cut determination of that fact. But I know 
of no such determination that has ever been made 
yet, and I know of no such counsel who has such 
a shining armor of virtue that he has been doing 
that in this community or in any other commu-
nity." (R. 227) 
If this Court desires to take a position and announce 
to the public and the Bar generally that in situations of 
this kind, where counsel for either side is aware of false 
testimony being given in the case, he should immediately, 
forthrightly and unequivocally announce to the Court 
his knowledge concerning the matter, every member of 
the Bar of this state should be apprised of his responsi-
bilit~'· Mr. King should not be pilloried because of the 
areusations of an unscrupulous attorney or made the 
Pxample of a principle which has yet to be formulated 
and defined by this Court. 
SUMl\IARY 
It is respectfully submitted that in view of all the 
fad~ and circumstanreR in this case, the charges against 
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Mr. King should be dismissed and that the recommenda-
tion and proposed order of the Board of Bar Commis-
sioners be rejected. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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